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RECENT CASE NOTES
BAmmENT-TROVER AND CONVERSION-This was an action by the plain-
tiff against the defendant for conversion of coal. The defendant was owner
of a farm abutting the plaintiff's right of way, and said coal was thrown
on the defendant's land by reason of a wreck on this right of way at a
point adjoining the defendant's farm. The coal could not be removed with-
out going across the defendant's land, and the plaintiff's agents asked de-
fendant's permission to go on his land and remove the coal. This permis-
sion was refused unless the plaintiff would pay $35. An agent of the plain-
tiff had been authorized to remove the coal, and he did remove some of it,
but the defendant forbade him to remove the balance. The jury rendered
a general verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff filed a motion for a
new trial on the grounds that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient
evidence, and that the verdict was contrary to law. This motion was over-
ruled and judgment rendered. Plaintiff appealed. Held, the defendant
was not guilty of conversion.1
In the decision of this case, the Indiana Appellate Court apparently
proceeded upon the theory that the defendant by refusing the plaintiff per-
mission to come upon his land to get the coal was doing no more than he
had a legal right to do, and that therefore such refusal to allow plaintiff
to regain possession of his own property, unless a payment of money was
made, was not a conversion. Unquestionably this leaves the parties in
status quo, and is an unsatisfactory solution of the problem. It is the pur-
pose of this note to show that this solution is incorrect, and with the sup-
port of adequate authority to show that there arose a bailment relation-
ship between the parties, under which the defendant incurred certain duties
and liabilities, thereby making his refusal of permission to obtain the coal
a conversion.
A bailment has been defined as the rightful possession of chattels by
one not the owner.2 Generally, in order to constitute a transaction an
actual bailment, there must be a delivery to the bailee, either actual,3 or
what some courts call "constructive". 4 In many cases, however, a bail-
ment arises where the person having possession of chattels holds them
under such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the obligation of
I Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Pope (1934), 188 N. E. 594.
,Willlston, Contracts (1920, vol. 2), sec. 1032; Willis, Introduction to Anglo-
American Law (1926) 42.
aBertig v. Norman (1911), 101 Ark. 75, 141 S. W. 201; AtM Coast Line R. FL
Co. v. Baker (1903), 118 Ga. 809, 45 S. B. 673; Van Wagoner v. Buckley (1912),
148 App. Div. 808, 133 N. Y. S. 599; Barns v. Stern Bros. (1915), 89 Misc. 385,
151 N. Y. S. 887; Houghton v. Lynch (1868), 13 Minn. 85.
a Gilson v. Pennsylvania Pt P. Co. (1914), 86 N. J. I,. 446, 92 Atl. 59; Sherman
v. Hicks (1908), 14 N. M. 439, 94 Pac. 959; Bertig v. Norman (1911), 101 Ark.
75, 141 S. W. 201; Hanes v. Shapiro (1915), 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33.
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delivering them to the owner.5 In the case of such bailment it is not neces-
sary that there be either actual or constructive delivey.6 Discussion of
examples of this type of bailment will be deferred until the matter of
acceptance has been treated.
Since the duties and responsibilities of a bailee cannot be thrust upon
a person without his knowledge or against his consent, it is essential to a
bailment that there be an acceptance of the subject matter.7 But it is not
requisite that acceptance be actual, one that is constructive is sufficient,
as where a person comes into actual possession and control fortuitously or
by mistake; for example, where goods were mistakenly delivered by an
expressman to a person not the consignee;S where property was acci-
dentally stored on a railroad's right of way; 9 where the consignee left
goods at the railroad depot without taking them;10 where property came
into possession of a public officer, though it was not his duty to receive
it;" in the case of a finder;12 where the span of a bridge was deposited
upon a man's land without any fault of the bridge owner;l3 where ties
were left upon a right of way which reverted to the original owners of
the land;14 or where a passenger inadvertently left a package upon the
seat of a railroad car.1 5 Story says, "Such situations might be called in-
voluntary deposits as contradistinguished from those which are necessary
and voluntary, inasmuch as the latter presuppose some act of the de-
positor, whereas the former may be without his assent or knowledge."16
Hale, in his Law of Bailments and Carriers,17 says that these deposits
may arise whenever the goods of one person have by an unavoidable casulty
or accident been lodged upon another's land, as where lumber floating in
the river is cast upon a neighbor's land by a sudden freshet, or where
goods are blown upon other's land by a tempest;' 8 and that the owner of
the land is a quasi bailee with duties similar to those of a finder of lost
property, so that if he should refuse to deliver the goods to their owner or
'Wentworth v. Riggs (1913), 143 N. Y. S. 955; Gilson v. Pennsylvania i. R.
Co. (1914), 86 N. J. L. 446, 92 Atl. 59.
"Wentworth v. Riggs (1913), 143 N. Y. S. 955.
' Bohannon v. Springfield (1846), 9 Ala. 789; Blosser Co. v. Donnan (1910),
8 Ga. App. 285, 68 S. E. 1074; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Carrow (1874), 73 Ill.
348; Krumsky v. Loeser (1902), 37 Misc. 504, 75 N. Y. S. 1012; Delaware, Lacka-
wanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Central Stock-Yard & Transit Co. (1889), 45
N. J. Eq. 50, 17 Atl. 146.
sNewhall v. Paige (1858), 10 Gray (Mass.) 366.
'Walker v. Norfolk R. R. Co. (1910), 67 W. Va. 273, 275, 67 S. E. 722.
10 Smith v. Nashua & Lowell Rt. R. Co. (1853), 27 N. -L 86.
U Phelps v. People (1878), 72 N. Y. 334.
22 Armory v. Delamirie (1722), 1 Str. 505, 93 Eng. Rpr. 664, Smith Lead.
Cas. 631.
13Foster v. Juniata Bridge Co. (1851), 16 Pa. St. 393.
'&Moss Tie Co. v. Kreilich (1899), 80 Mo. App. 304.
IsFoulke v. N. Y. Consolidated R. I. (1920), 228 N. Y. 269, 127 N. B. 237.
"sCommentaries on the Law of Bailments (1832), secs. 44, 88. Story, In see.
41, defines a deposit as "a naked bailment of goods, to be kept for the bailor with-
out reward, and to be returned when he shall require it."
11 (1896) 44.
"Anthony v. Haney (1832), 8 Bing. 187, 131 Eng. Repr. 372; Mitten v. Fau-
drye (1019), Poph. 161, Latch 13, 79 Eng. Repr. 1259; Nicholson v. Chapman
(1793), 2H. Bi. 254, 126 Eng. Repr. 536.
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to permit him to remove them, he might be held liable for conversion. 19
So, also, the owner might enter and take them away, the entry being au-
thorized by necessity.20 In a recent article,2 1 Laidlaw says, "It is believed
that where chattels are cast upon the land, the owner of the land has the
possession of the chattel upon it so that he is bailee, for a person in pos-
session of the land is taken to have possession of all that is in or upon it.
As long as he is ignorant of the presence of the chattel, doubtless he owes
no duty of care towards it."
From an examination of these authorities and an application of their
principles to the case under consideration, it is obvious that the defendant
was clearly a bailee of an involuntary deposit, as he was certainly aware
of the presence of the coal upon his land and acknowledged his control of
its removal. The defendant thereby incurred certain duties and liabilities
which the law imposes upon bailees.
The duties of a bailee generally are to exercise diligence of some sort
in the keeping of the chattel, 22 and to return the identical property bailed,
or in some cases -the substitute or product of that thing, upon termination
of the bailment. 23 The bailee of an involuntary deposit likewise has simi-
lar duties, though probably to a lesser degree; 24 in such a bailment, the
bailor may at any time terminate the bailment upon giving notice to the
bailee.2 5
Therefore, the plaintiff in the principal case terminated the bailment
and obtained an immediate right to possession by his demand on the de-
fendant who, as bailee, was under a duty to return the chattel himself, or
at least to allow the plaintiff to come upon the land to get the chattel, and
his refusal to do this amounted to a conversion as a matter of law; for a
conversion may consist of a detention or nondelivery, without legal excuse,
after demand for delivery has been made by the person entitled to pos-
session or his duly authorized agent.26  R. S. 0.
19Anthony v. Haney (1832), 8 Bing. 187, 131 Eng Repr. 372; Nicholson v.
Chapman (1793), 2H B1. 254, 126 Eng. Repr. 536.
"Mitten v. Faudrye (1019), Poph. 161, Latch 13, 79 Eng. lRepr. 1259.
21Principles of Bailment (1931), 16 Corn. L. Q. 286.
2 Whitney v. Lee (1844), 8 Metc. (Mass.) 91; Mason v. St. Louis Union Stock
Yards Co. (1894), 60 Mo. App. 93; Warren v. Finn (1913), 84 N. J. L. 206, 86 Atl.
530; Coggs v. Bernard (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Repr. 107; Conner v.
Winton (1856), 8 Ind. 315.
=Jensen v. Eagle Ore Co. (1910), 47 Colo. 306, 107 Pac. 279; Johnson v. Chi-
cago Feather Co. (1912), 172 Ill. App. 81; Hurd v. West (1827), 7 Cow. (N. Y.)
752; Kowing v. Manly (1872), 49 N. Y. 192; Colyar v. Taylor (1860), 1 Cold.
(Tenn.) 372; Southcote's Case (1601), 4 Coke 83b; Lichtenheim v. The Boston &
P. R. R. Co. (1853), 11 Cush. (Mass.) 70.
"Dougherty v. Posegate (1856), 3 Iowa 88; Burns v. State (1910), 145 Wis.
373, 128 N. W. 987; Foulke v. N. Y. Consolidated R.. B. (1920), 228 N. Y. 269,
127 N. E. 237.
2 53cLain v. Huffman (1875), 30 Ark. 428; Montgomery v. Evans (1850),
8 Ga. 178; Hodges v. Hurd (1868), 47 Ill. 363; Amberg v. Philbrick (1889), 33
Ill. App. 200; Zackman v. Partridge (1849), 21 Vt. 558.26 Coffln v. Anderson (1837), 4 Blackf. 395; Donlin v. McQuade (1896), 61
Mich. 275, 28 N. W. 114; Lopard v. Symons (1904), 85 N. Y. S. 1025; Wykoff v.
Stevenson (1884), 46 N. J. L. 326; Nordin v. First Trust & Savings Bank of
Pasadena (1931), 118 Cal. App. 697, 6 Pac. (2nd) 92; Denvir v. Crowe (1928),
321 Mo. 212, 9 S. W. (2nd) 957; Alexander H. Abrahams & Co. v. Southwestern R.
